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Corruption in Bank Lending to Firms:
Do Competition and Information Sharing MaUer?
Jalnes R. Barth a, Chen Lin b , Ping Lin b and Frank M. Songc*
Abstract

Building on the important study by Beck. Demirguc-Kunt and Levine ρ 00旬，
we examine the effects of borrower and lender conψetition and 粉rmation
sharing νia credit registries/bureaus on corruption in bank lending. Using the
unique World Bank dataset 01 the World Business Environment Survey (WBES)
coνering 58 countries and i可ormation on credit registries/ bureaus and bank
regulati切1 assembled by other scholars, we find (1) strong evidence that banking
competition reduces lending corruption and (2) the first and robust evidence that
l可ormation sharing among banks (especially via private bureaus) contribufes to
reducù穹的-ruption in bank lending. We also find that government- and foreignowned firms as well as 以porting firms tend to be subject to less lending
corruption , objective courts and better law enforcement tend to reduce lending
corruption， 的d private and fore但n owneJ叫 ip 01 the banking industηJ are
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1. Introduction
Banks matter for countries at all stages of development and in all pa此s of the
world. Banking systems that operate efficiently facilitate the channeling and
monitoring of savings to the most productive investment projects and thereby
enhance the perfonnance of economies. Since bank lending is a major source of
extemal finance for business finns , especially in developing and emerging market
'a) Department of Finance , Auburn University and Milken lnstitute , USA , i.Qarth {@， milkeninstitute.or皂，
b) Department of Economics , Lingnan University , Hong Kong , fhen.1 inlâlln .edu .hk , and
D1 in (a) ln.edu.hk; and c) School of Economics and Finance, University of Hong Kong,
fmson 皂白lecon . hku.hk

We thank Paul Evans , Edward Green , Belton Fleisher, Wing Suen , Yijiang Wang , Colin Xu , Ruilin
Zhou , and participants in the 4 Summer Workshop on Industrial Organization and Management
Strategy at Shanghai University of Finance and Economics and the economics and finance workshop
at The University of Hong Kong for helpful comments and suggestions
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economies , a wel1-functioning banking system can also help reduce income
inequality and poverty. Indeed , recent research suggests that banks exert a firstorder impact on economic development (e.g. , Levine , 1997 and 2005).
Unfo此unately， banking systems do not always operate efficiently in countries.
In particul 缸， they are susceptible to corruption , which underrnines their primary
function of allocating scarce capital efficiently. This is a particularly serious
problem in developing and transition countries to the extent that they lack
adequate laws , objective courts , prude叫 al rεgulations ， and other appropriate
institutions to sufficiently contain corruption. In this regard , China, among other
countries , has been moving aggressively to address the corruption problem. For
example , 461 cases of bank fraud involving more than one million yuan
(US$125 ,000) each were uncovered in China in 2005. These cases alone amounted
to 7.7 billion yuan in fraudulent activity.l As another example , in 2000 , Turkey's
banking sector suffered losses of some $12 billion (about 6% of GDP). Some of
the worst performing banks had been run by some of Turkey's top business and
political figures. The banking crisis prompted an anti-corruption drive. 2 These and
other examples of bank corruption in countries everywhere are quite costly
because when bank managers take deposits and then pass them along to businesses
not solely based on efficiency considerations , fewer funds are available to support
more worthy business initiatives. The poor and unconnected individuals with
innovative ideas are alsô denied funds to realize their dreams and improve their
economic condition (Barth , Caprio , and Levine , 2006).
Despite its importance , there are surprisingly few studies , either theoretical or
empirical , of the determinants of corruption in obtaining bank loans by firms.
lndeed , the only one of which we are aware of is by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and
Levine (2006 , BDL hereafter). In an empirical study , they rely on the answer to a
survey question in the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) -“ Is the
corruption of bank officials an obstacle for the operation and growth of your
business? 刊- to measure the degree of corruption in bank lending. BDL then
examine the relationship between bank supervisory power and lending corruption
and find that strengthening traditional official supervision does not have a positive
1m
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Yahoo! News Asia , Nov. 1, 2006.
HighBeam Research , www.highbeam .com/doc.
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The BDL study is important because it overcomes the difficulty of measuring
the degree of bank corruption by resorting to a firm-based survey question on the
obstacles for operating and growing a firm due to bank-lending corruption. It also
has significant policy implications insofar as it finds that the conventional official
regulatory framework that relies on empowering official supervisory agencies to
directly monitor, control , and discipline banks does not improve the integrity of
bank lending. Rather, BDL find that empowering private monitoring of banks
works best to promote integrity in bank lending.
Our paper is motivated by the pioneering work of BD L. We follow their lead
and measure lending corruption by using the same survey responses of firms
regarding the obstacles in obtaining bank loans due to co叮upt bankers. 3
1mportantly, however, we extend their study to examine whether bank competition
and information sharing help to curtail co汀uption in bank lending. To set the stage
for our empirical work, we develop a bargaining model of a firm and ba心r to
highlight the determinants of lending corruption. More specifically , a Nash
bargaining model is developed in which the finn and the banker negotiate the
terms of a bank loan. Bribery is then introduced to allow a finn to obtain a bank
]oan at a ]ower rate than otherwise. Factors that strengthen the bargaining power of
the firm manager vs. the banker, however , are shown to help reduce the likelihood
and the amount of bank bribery . We now briefly describe the predictions provided
by our mode l.
First, our model predicts that greater competition among banks , by enhancing
the bargaining power of the firm over . that of the banker, reduces lending
co叮uption. 1n contrast , increased competition among firms could increase lending
corruption since greater competitive pressure in their market could force a firm
manager to be more aggressive in seeking a bank loan. 1n our model , this
pa口icular situation implies lower bargaining power of the finn manager and thus a
greater resort to bribery in bank lending. A possible additional effect of increased
firm competition , however, is a higher default risk, which in our model implies a
higher “ fair interest rate". Since the firm manager bribes the banker in exchange
for a lower interest rate than the risk-adjusted or “ fair interest rate'\the higher the
latter rate , the larger the gap between it and the discretionary loan rat

According to BDL , althou gh the measure of lending corruption is based on the managers' subjective
view of financing obstacles when dealing with banks , any potential resulting biases do not affect the
results in any particular direction. In fact , to the extent that those measurement error problems are not
systematically related to country characteristics , this may be Iess of a concern when studying variations
in corruption across countries. See section 3 of our paper for greater detaiI on this point

o

Second , it is well known that banks are exposed to problems of infonnation
asymmetry , in which lenders and borrowers possess different information about
the risk of defaul t. Pagano and Jappelli (1993) in this regard point out that
infonnation sharing among lenders , through institutions such as credit bureaus ,
augments the due diligence process, by providing infonnation about borrowers'
characteristics and credit histories. This helps to mitigate the problem of adverse
selection , in which borrowers whose credit worthiness is not easily discernable by
lenders may accept less atlractive loan terms because they are also the ones most
likely to defaul t. It can also be beneficial in addressing the moral hazard problem
in which a borrower may not take sufficient precautions to avoid default after
obtaining a loan, through its positive incentive effects on borrowers who desire
access to credit in the future (Padilla and Pagano , 1997 and 1999). In our model ,
we study the effect of infonnation sharing on lending corruption and find that it
helps decrease bank-lending corruption , by reducing the degree of discretion that
can be exercised in evaluating loan applicants due to imperfect infonnation.
Additional predictions from our model suggest that state or foreign ownership
of a finn lowers lending corruption , by lowering the default risk and enhancing the
bargaining power of the finn. In the case of banks , foreign or private ownership
helps reduce lending corruption because of greater concern about an adverse
reputational effect , better managerial incentives and /or negative externalities on
their operations in other countries.
In the empirical part of the paper, we test the predictions of our bargaining
model by combining infonnation 企om three databases. First , as mentioned above ,
we follow BDL in measuring lending corruption by using the same survey
question noted above from the WBES. Second , we rely on Barth , Capiro , ànd
Levine (2006 , BCL herea缸er) to measure various dimensions of bank regulation
across different countries. BCL present and discuss a new database on bank
regulation in 152 countries during 2001-2003. In particular , it includes detailed
measures of bank entry regulations , capital requirements , supervisory powers ,
explicit deposit insurance schemes , private monitoring，叮/ pe of bank ownership ,
among other regulatory variables. Third , we obtain measures of infonnation
sh
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both banking competition and infonnation sharing are important
determinants of bank lending corruption.
We obtain two main empirical results. First , as predicted by our theory , greater
competition in banking helps to curtaiI co叮uption in lending. However, as in BDL
(2006) , increased competition among finns does not significantly reduce lending
co汀uption. Second , information sharing , by making infonnation more timely and
accurate though credit registries , helps reduce corruption in bank lending.
However, we find that only private bureaus have a significant effect in reducing
lending corruption , whereas public registries do not appear to have asignificant
effec t. We bel ieve that this has to do with the fact that private bureaus- generally
contain finer infonnation about borrowers than do public registries. 1n particular,
the infonnation available from public credit registries consists mainly of credit
data above a certain threshold (minimum loan size) and is disseminated in
consolidated fonn (no detaiIs on individual Ioans). The private credit bureaus , in
contrast , offer details on individual loans and merge the credit infonnation with
data from other sources (e.g. , courts , tax authorities , and financial statements).4
Beyond the above two major findings , we obtain several additional results: (1)
govemment- and foreign-owned firms tend to be subject to less lending corruption.
Our explanation for this finding is that these government-/foreign-owned firms
tend to have more bargaining power in negotiations for loans with banks and they
could also be subject to lower defau \t risk. (2) Exporting finns tend to be subject
to Iess lending corruption. This is because they may aIso haveεreater access to
extemal finance and hence more bargaining power in negotiations for loans with
banks. (3) Objective courts and better law enforcement tend to reduce lending
corruption. This is expected since lending corruption is generally related to other
illegal activities and the expropriation of creditors' rights so that a we l1functioning legal environment helps to reduce these practices. (4) Private and
foreign ownership of the banking industry are associated with more integrity in
lending.
We perfonn a number of robustness tests on our results. Specifically, we
expand our control variables by including major macro-economic and institutional
measures. We also examine the poten
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See section 3.4 for more discussion on the differences between private bureaus and public registries

typically study cross-count句， macro measures of public corruption. 5 For example ,
Knack and Keefer (1995) and Mauro (1995) use indicators of corruption
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吋).0 Others rely on perception-based measures like the Corruption Perception
lndex by Transparency Intemationa l. Few studies rely on m icro- and firm-based
measures of corruption. Some exceptions are Svensson (2003) , Fisman and
S 丸' ensson (2001) , and Clark and Xu (2004). The first two studies use finn 叫rvey
data from Uganda to study the magnitude of corruption and its impact on firm
perfonnance. More specifically , Svensson (2003) provides evidence that the
amount of a bribe a finn needs to pay is negatively correlated with the degree of
reversibility of a capital stock investmen t. Fisman and Svensson (2001) find that
bribery is negatively co叮elated with finn growth. Clarke and Xu (2004) use
enterprise-level data in 21 transition economies to examine how characteristics of
the public utilities taking bribes and the finns paying bribes affect corruption in
the secto r. In this paper, we follow these more recent studies insofar as relying on
micro-based measures of corruption in the fonn of finn survey data to study banklending corruption.
A controversial issue in the corruption literature is whether increased
competition can reduce corruption. Some argue that greater firm competition could
lead to less corruption because firms' profits are driven down by the heightened
competitive pressure to the point at which there are no excess profits from which
to pay bribes (Ades and Di Tella , 1999). Others , such as a study by Bliss and Di
Tella (1997) , argue that the level of graft demanded per finn depends on the
likelihood that finns in the market are more or less likely to exit due to a marginal
increase in graft demand , not on the number of firms in the market or the degree of
“ natural" competition. As regards competition among briber takers , RoseAckennan (1978) argues that increased competition (among the officials receiving
the potential bribes) reduces co訂uption. Similarly , Shleifer and Vishny (1 993)
argue that when officials dispense govemment-produced goods , such as passports~
the existence of a competing official in which to reapply to when asked for a bribe
A common definition of public corruption is the misuse of public oftìce for private gain , such as the
sale of government property by govemment offtcials、 kickbacks in public procurement, or bribery and
embezzlement of govemment funds (Svensson , 2005) . However, corruption can also take the form of
collusion between fìrms or misuse of corporate assets that imposes costs on customers and investors
(private sector corruption)
6 The lnlernafional Countly Risk Guide corruption indicator captures the likelihood that high
government offìcials will demand special payments and the extent to which illegal payments are
expected through government tiers.
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will bid down the equilibrium amount of corruption. However, there is lack of
convincing empirical evidence supporting this argument about the benefit of
greater competition (Svensson , 2005). 1n this paper , we provide such evidence in
the case of bank Iending. Fina Il y , in the corruption literature , there is no discussion
about the role of information sharing in reducing corruption. We provide the first
evidence indicating that infonnation sharing helps to a Il eviate the impacts of
asymmetric information on bribery in the bargaining process for Ioans between
firms and banks.
We aIso contribute to the bank competition literature. Berger et al. (2004)
survey an extant literature on the effect of bank competition on the perfonnance of
banks (e.g. , bank efficiency , bank net interest margins (profits) , and bank risktaking) , firms' access to extemaI financing , and tìnancial stability. However , the
surveyed literature seems to provide no cI ear answer to the question as to whether
bank competition is “ good" or “ bad" from a social perspective (e.g. , AIIen et a 1.
2001). Our paper indicates that one positive and important aspect of bank
competition is in reducing corruption, apart from any impacts on bank efficiency
and stability.
In the information-sharin :;:,2: ...-.
literature. it is well known that in bankinσthere are
substantial infonnation-asymmetry problems. The information wedge between
lenders and borrowers may prevent the efficient allocation of Iending , Ieading to
credit rationing (e.g. , Jaffee and RusseII , 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss , 1981) or to a
wedge between lending and borrowing rates (e.g. , King 1986). Infonnation
sharing among lenders , by augmenting the due diligence process , helps to mitigate
the problem of adverse selection (Pagano and Jappelli , 1993). It can also be
valuable in addressing moral hazard problems through its incentive effects on
curtailing imprudent borrower behavior (Padilla and Pagano , 1997 and 2000). In
this way , information sharing contributes positively to the functioning of credit
markets (J appelli and Pagano , 2002).
However , few empirical studies have examined the effect of information
sharing on bank lending and default risk. One study by Jappe lI i and Pagano (2002)
finds that bank lending is higher and credit risk is lower in countries where lenders
share infonnation , regardless of the private or public nature of the infonnationsharing mechanism
~'~'-，
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failure prediction models after controlling for other credit infonnation that is easily
available to lenders. Our paper suggests that more 'timely and accurate information
about a borrowing firm is likely to be conducive in reducing corruption in bank
lending , with empirical support provided based on firrn-Ievel survey data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a Nash
bargaining model for negotiating a loan between a firm manager and a bank loan
officer. The model generates several important predictions conceming the
relationship between competition , information sharing and corruption in bank
lending. Section 3 describes our data and provides variable definitions used in the
empirical work. Section 4 presents and discusses our empirical results. Section 5
presents some robustness tests of our major results. Section 6 con c1 udes the paper
with a discussion of some policy implications of the results.
2. Model
2 1 A Nash Bargaining Model of Bank Lending Corruption
In this section , we construct a simple Nash bargaining model between a firrn
and a bank to highlight the process and detenllinants of bank-Iending corruption.
The firm desires to secure one unit of a loan for an investment project. The bank
has to decide whether to provide the loan to the firrn and , if it does , what interest
rate to charge. Once the loan application of the finll is submitted , the ba叫(er (a
loan officer) will examine the creditworthiness ofthe borrower and decide upon an
interest rate to charge the loan applican t.
Let R denote the “ fair interest rate" the firm should pay. lt reflects the firrn' s
default risk, given the level of competition among banks in supplying loans. The
greater the firm's default risk , the higher wi I1 be R. The fair interest rate also
depends on the market power the bank possesses in supplying loans. The more
competition in the banking sector , the lower wiII be R. Similarly , R also depends
on the degree of competition the firrn faces in its product marke t. The more
competition among firms , the lower a finll 's retum from an investment project,
7
and hence the lower its ability wiU be to pay back a loan.
Let 1 denote the amount (or the set) of infonnation available to a bank when
examining the loan application. 1 contains a Il the relevant information a bank can
assess regarding a firm's proposed investment project, corporate govemance ,
financial strength , and credit historγ . An important source of this type of
,

7 The outcome ofthe firm ' s project to be financed by the bank loan may be uncertain , Our focus here is
on the po ss ibility ofbribery between the firm and the loan officer, so we simply use R to capture all the
underlying uncertainty that may be associated with the firm ' s investment project

8

infomlation about the borrower that may be available is credit registries or credit
bureaus. When infonnation-sharing facilities like these are available , a bank is
able to obtain more information about a firm so as to determine the level of default
risk and thereby '^收ther to lend money a叫， if so , the interest rate to charge. We
can express this relationship as foIIows:
R

= R(f, Comp j ' ComPh) ,

where ComPI stands for the degree of competition the finn faces in its product
market and Compb the degree of competition in the banking secto r. (Of course ,
other factors also affect the level of default risk of the finn as wiII be discussed
below.)
Given the level of banking competition and the infonnation set 1, and hence R ,
the bank may offer a lower rate , R - ~， or r, to the finn , in exchange for a bribe , B ,
B 三~. If the two parties can strike a deal , then the finn receives the loan at a lower
interest rate than otherwise , and the loan officer takes the bribe. If they fail to
strike a deal , then the finn receives the loan at the rate R, and the loan officer gets
nothing extra personally from the transaction. Therefore , the disagreement point of
the finn is d j = π- R and the disagreement point of the loan officer is d b = 0 ,
whereπis

the net profit of the finn from its investment project.
One can think of R - ~ as an acceptable rate of interest to the bank, given that
infonnation about a borrower is in general imperfect (or asymmetric). The idea is
that absent perfect infonnation about the loan applicant, there is always some level
of discretion that must be used in setting the loan rate , even by an uncorrupted
loan office r. lt is useful here to not consider ~ as a decision variable in the bribery
dea l. Rather, R - ~， or r can be regarded as the lowest .interest rate that would be
acceptable to the bank , given the information set 1 and the fair rate R. 8
Of course , the extent of such discretion (or ambiguity as to whether the
interest rate reflects bribery or not) that exists or may be exercised depends on the
amount of infonnation available to the bank prior to granting the loan, among
other things. Thus , ~ is a function of 1. But it may also depend on the degree of
competition on both the lender and the borrower sides , thus
~

= ~(f ， Comp f 、 ComPh) .

Bribery, of course, may be detected and thus punished by the bank manager
and/or regulator, in which case the loan officer wi l1 be penalized (e.g. , demoted ,
fined and/or even face more stringent legal sanctions). Let p denot
In fact , even when ~ is a decision variable it will then be in the best interest of the barga ining parties
to choose R - ~ ， or r, to be the lowest acceptable level , so as to maximize the amount that can be
shared between them in the bribery bargaining game.
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of detecting bribery and

Ch

the amount of pena)ty imposed on a loan office r. 1n

addition to 丸， the bribe wiII be confiscated by the bank. Thus , the expected payoff
to a loan officer iS (1 -p)B-pc" . We also assume that if the bribery is discovered ,
then the rate of interest owed on the )oan amount will be adjusted upwards to the
fair rate R for the firm (gross of the bribe amount). Hence , the expected payoff of
the finn is
(1-

p)( 方 -R+ f:. -B)+p( π -R).

The generalized Nash bargaining problem is thus given by:9
Maximize [((1- p)(π - R+ f:.- B)+ p(π 一的一 d/ W-α x [(卜 p)B - PC h

-

d

,,

]a,

with respect to B , and whereαmeasures the bargaining power of the bank loan
officer, and 1 一 αthat of the firm.
Taking the logarithm of the objective function and solving the first-order
condition provides the equilibrium amount of bribery to the bank loan officer
under the Nash bargaining solution:
B ﹒ =α x f:.+~一(1 -α )C h
1- p

The solution has an intuitive interpretation: in the bribery bargaining situation , the
loan officer receives a share of the net gain f:. of the deal in proportion to his/her
bargaining power, plus the risk-premium of getting caught for bribery.'o
2.2 Predictions ofthe Bargaining Model
Competition in the banking sector lowers the bargaiñi i1 g power of the bank
(l oan officer) ， α ， leading to a decl ine in B *. (While increased competition also
lowers the rate on a loan , R , it is not clear how it may affect the extent of
directional change in granting the loan , 6.). Increased competition on the firm side
increases default risk and hence lowers the bargaining power of the fiml (soαwill
increase) , resulting in greater bank lending corruption , B *.
月;pothes is

1:
• Competition in the banking sector reduces bank lending corruption by
lowering the loan officer's bargaining power (α).

The existing theoretical literature on corruption has focused on bribery between a government offìci刻，
(e.g. , a regulator) and a fìrm applying for a license. Bargaining models in the literature thus postulate
that the government official has full barga ining power (Bliss and Di Tella, 1997 and Ades and Di Tel 峙，
1999). 1n our model , because there is competition on both th巴 bribery taker and bribery giver sides , we
use a generalized Nash bargaining framework .

9
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We assume that C b 三匕J!..6. so that B* is within the fe的 ble range , i.e. , B'
p

10

$

6.

•

Competition on the finn side increases corruption by raising the default risk
of the loan and lowering the finn's bargaining power (卜的.

Now consider the effects of infonnation sharing on bank-lending C01γuption.
More information sharing among lenders about loan applicants increases
infonnation accuracy and timeliness , thus leading to less discretion or ambiguity
in interest rate setting (i.e. , ð. becomes smaller as the amount of infonnation
increases). Thus , B* declines with infonnation sharing.
月)pothesis

.

2:
1nfonnation sharing among lenders (via credit registries or credit bureaus)
helps reduce bank-lending corruption , by limiting the discretio n/ambiguity
that exists in evaluating loan applicants due to imperfect infonnation.

The type of ownership on both the borrower and lender sides can also affect
the level of bank-lending corruption. State ownership of the finn (borrower) , for
example , may increase the bargaining power of the finn in dealing with banks ,
thereby lowering B 大 AIso， due to the presence of a “ soft-budget constraint" and
hence a higher probability of repaying a bank loan , state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
may be safer borrowers relative to other finns. Furthennore , SOEs sometimes can
obtain bank loans due to govemment policy so there is less of a need to bribe bank
officers. 1n the care of foreign-owned finns , they may have altemative channels
for obtaining funding for their investments (e.g. , from their parent companies).
Altemative戶 to bank loans in tum implies greater bargaining power and hence a
lower B * in .our mode l.
On the lende凹， side , it is not that clear what fonn of ownership facilitates
combating bank-Iending corruption. It can be argued that foreign banks or private
banks may care more about their c。中orate reputation and thus exert greater effort
in preventing bribe taking by their loan officers, relative to state-owned banks.
Furthennore , private and foreign ownership may strengthen managerial incentives
to monitor potential corruptive behavior of employees , thus reducing bribes.
Moreover , bank corruption once detected has wider negative extemalities among
branches of multinational banks operating in different countries , which gives
foreign banks an extra incentive to fight lending corruption.

11
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3
• State ownership of borrowing firms tends to reduce bank-lending corruption
(not necessarily because of a better quality of investment , but because of a
“ soft- budget constraint刊) .
• Foreign ownership of borrowing finns may help decrease bank-lending
corruption because it may give the borrower greater bargaining power.
• Foreign or private ownership of banks helps reduce lending corruption
because of the reputational effect, better managerial incentives and negative
extemalities on their operations in other countries.

The above hypothesis leads to the following observation. ln the bargaining
solution , the equilibrium level of bribery B* increases with the probability of
getting caught, p. This can be understood as follows. As p increases , the loan
officer demands greater compensation from the finn due to the heightened risk of
detection. Yet , the overall expected utility of the corrupted loan officer decreases
with p. ln fact , the expected value of corruption , (l -p) B. - PC b = (1- p)αð. - PC b
decreases with increases in both p and C h . Thus , improved bank management or
govemment regulation , by making detection of bribery a priority and raising the
penalty on corrupted bank officials when being caught , reduces corruption on the
whole , but increases the amount of bribes taken by those bank officers who
continue such behavio r.
3. Data and Variables
3.1 The Sample
The dataset used in this study is compiled from three main sources: (1) the
World Business Environment Survey (WBES) on corruption in 80 countries , (2)
the BCL (2006) dataset on bank supervision and regulation in 152 countries , (3)
and the DMS (2007) dataset on infonnation sharing in 129 countries. Most finnlevel data used in the study come from the WBES , which was conducted in 2000
by a team from the World Bank. Managers from over 9 ,000 finns in more than 80
countries were surveyed with a standard questionnaire. The main pu巾。 se was to
identify the driving factors behind and obstacles to enterprise perfonnance and
growth in countries around the world. The questionnaire covered many aspects of
a finn' s operations , including questions on corruption , regulation , and institutional
environmen t. BDL (2006) note three advantages in using the WBES data in
studying bank corruption. First, it provides direct information on the degree to
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which corruption in lending represents an obstacle to finns. Second , the finns
surveyed vary in size , ownership (both public and private) , industrial sector, and
organizational structure. 1n particular , the dataset covers a large proportion of
small- and medium-size enterprises , whereas most other cross-country studies
focus exclusively on large , listed finns. Third , the finn-Ievel survey data al10w us
to control for firm-specific characteristics and hence to draw appropriate
inferences about the relationships between competition, infonnation sharing and
bank corruption.
The banking competition and ownership data come from BCL (2006) , which
were compiled based on a World Bank survey on bank regulation and supervision
in 152 countries durinσ2001-2003.
The information-sharing variables come from
。DMS (2007) , who collect data on private and public credit institutions in 129
countries during 1978-2003. Because of the incomplete overlap among the three
datasets and missing firm-level and banking-sector variables , the final sample used
in our study includes 4 ,395 enterprises in 58 countries all over the world. 11
1n addition to the three datasets mentioned above , we rely on three other data
sources , the World Development 1ndicator (WD1 , 2004) , the World Govemance
lndicator compiled by Kaufmann et a1. (2006) , and Triesman (2000) , to control for
macro- institutional factors that might affect the overalllevel of bank corruption in
a country. Tables 1 and 2 identify the data sources and provide brief descriptions
and summary statistics ofthe key variables.
[Tables 1 and 2 here]
3.2. Bank Corruption
The bank corruption measure is the dependent variable in our analysis.
Following BDL (2006) , we construct the measure of corruption (Corruption)
using data from WBES. Specifically , it is based on the key question conceming
bank corruption in the survey. The question takes the following fonn: “ Is
comlption of bank officials an obstacle for the operation and growth of your
business"? Answers vary between 1 (no obstacle) , 2 (a minor obstacle) , 3 (a
moderate obstacle) , and 4 (a major obstacle). Thus , a higher value indicates more
severe and pervasive corruption in lending. Thus , the WBES data provide direct
infonnation for finns about the degree of specific , perceived obstacles.
The countries include Albania , Argentina , Armenia , Azerbaijan、 Belarus ， Boli via , Bosnia , Botswana,
Brazil , Bul garia , Canada 、 Chile ， Colombia, Costa Rica、 Co te d' Ivoire , Croatia‘ Czech R ep、 Ecuador，
Egypt, E1 Salvador, Est o n 悶， Germany , Ghana , Guatemala, Honduras , Hun ga門 ， India , It aly ,
Kazakhstan , Kenya, Kyrgizstan , Lithuania , Malays 悶 ， Mexico , Moldova , Pakistan , Panama, Peru ,
Philippines , Poland , Portugal , Roman 泊， Russia , Senega1 , Slovakia, Sloven 悶， South Africa, Spain ,
Thailand , Trinidad&Tobago , Tunisia, Turkey , UK雪 US ， Ukraine , Uruguay , Venezuela , Zimbabwe

11
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As po inted out by BDL (2006) , there are good reaso ns for believ ing that these
se lf-reported data are not biasin g the resu 1ts in fa vo r of their or our findings . BDL
(2 006) pro v ide a detailed explanation and justification of this point (p p. , 2 1362137). As argued in BDL , if a finn facing the same obstacles responds to
questions di fferent1y in different instituti o na1 environments , then , to the extent that
this represents pure measurement e叮or， it would bi as the resu1ts 且早型旦旦 finding a
significant re1ationship between competitiol月 ， information sharing and finn
financing obsta c1 es. A1so , as in BDL , we obtain the sallle results when controlling
for many country-specific traits. Finally , additional work done or cited in BDL
show that firms' responses to the survey on financing obstacles are capturing more
than idiosyncratic differences in how firms rank obstacles; the survey data are
associated with measurable outcomes in tenns of efficiency of investment fl ows ,
firm growth , institutions , corruption and property ri ghts ,. in several recent and
influential studies (e.g. , Hellman et a 1., 2000; Djankov et a l., 2003; Beck ,
Demirguc-Kunt and Maskimovic , 2005; Acemoglu and 10hnson , 2005; Ayyagari
et a l., 2007). Beck , Demirg uc-Kunt and Peria (2007) show an objective measure of
access to and use of banking services across countries is closely related to the
WBES measure of firm financing obsta c1 es.

3.3. Competition
A key independent variable in our study is a measure of banking competition.
A widely used measure in this re gard is the concentration ratio (e .g. , DemirgucKunt , Laeven and Levine , 2004). We therefore use the share of the fì ve largest
banks in total bank deposits (Banking Concentration (Deposit)) from BCL (2006)
to measure banking concentration. Higher concentration indi cates less
cOlllpetitiveness within the banking industry. As a check on thè robustness of the
results , we use the share of total assets held by the fi ve largest banks in the
industry (Banking Con centration (Asse t)) as an altemati ve concentration measure
in our ana1ysis. As will be seen , both measures yield ve rγsimilar and consistent
results.
111 their survey paper of banking concentrati on and competition , Berger et a 1.
(2004) point out that bank competition is multifaceted insofar as it encolllpasses
not only bank concentration but a1so regulatory restrictions , such as entry
restrictions and other legal impediments t
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intended organization chart , financial projections for the first three years , financial
information on the main potential shareholders , the background of future directors
and managers , sources of funds to be disbursed in the capitalization of the new
bank and market differentiation intended for the new bank) are required to obtain a
banking license. The index ranges from 0 (l ow entry requirement) to 8 (high entrγ
requirement) , with higher values indicating greater stringency. The second
variable is the fraction of entry applications denied (Application Denied), which is
the percentage of applications to enter banking that have been denied in the past
five years. This variable varies significantly across countries. At one extreme , the
ratio is above 85% in countries like Egypt, Kenya and Pakistan. At the other
extreme , the ratio is below 50/0 in countries like France , Sweden and the United
States. All these data are from BCL (2006).
3 .4 . 1可ormation-Sharing

Another key independent variable in our analysis is information sharing. It is
argued that infonnation sharing among lenders , by augmenting the due diligence
process , helps to reduce the information gap and thereby mitigates the problems of
adverse selection and moral hazard (Pagano and Jappelli , 1993). ln our model ,
infonnation sharing among lenders (via credit registries or credit bureaus) helps in
lowering bank- lending corruption , by reducing the discretion that may be
exercised in evaluating loan applicants due to imperfect infonnation. Following
DMS (2007) , we include two dummy variables to measure infonnation sharing
among lenders. The first indicates whether a public credit registry (Public Credit
Registry ) exists , which equals one if a public credit registry is operating in the
country by the end of 1999 , and zero otherwise. A public registry is defined as a
database owned by a public authority , usually the central bank or banking
supervisory authority , which collects infonnation on the credit worthiness of
borrowers and makes it available to financial institutions (DMS , 2007). ln 2000 ,
public registries operated in 35 countries in our sample. The second measure
indicates whether a private credit bureau (Priνate Credit Bureau) exists , which
equals one if a private credit bureau is operating in the country by the end of 1999 ,
and zero otherwise. A private bureau is defined as a private commercial finn that
maintains a database
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contractual , but imposed by regulation. For this reason , public credit registries
usually have larger coverage than that of private bureaus (J appelli and Pagano ,
2002). However, a public credit registry also has some limitations. It is quite
common for public credit registries to set a minimum loan size and therefore to
collect infonnation only on loans in excess of this amount (Miller, 2003).
Furthermore , the infonnation from public credit registries consists mainly of credit
data and is disseminated in consolidated fonn (so that details about individual
loans are not available). 12 1n contrast , private credit bureaus offer details on
individual loans and merge credit data with data from other data sources (e.g. ,
courts , tax authorities and tìnancial statements) , though they are less
comprehensive in coverage (Jappelli and Pagano , 2002). Due to these differences ,
it is quite interesting to explore whether public credit registries and private bureaus
have different impacts on corruption in bank lending.
We also include a dummy variable (Firm Auditing) to measure the
completeness and accuracy of the financial statements disclosed by tìnns. This
variable equals one if a tìnn provides its shareholders with annual tìnancial
statements that have been reviewed by an extemal auditor, and zero otherwise. A
higher value indicates more complete and accurate infonnation disclosure of a
finn. Better finn tìnancial dis cI osure should improve the quality of infonnation
sharing and hence reduce the infonnation gap between banks and tìrms. Th is , in
tum , should reduce corruption.
Furthermore , we include the number ofyears since the establishment ofpublic
credit registries and private bureaus to measure the amount of infonnation sharing.
Public RegistlY Age is the number of years since the starting or establishment date
ofthe public registry. Private Bureau Age is the number ofyears since the starting
or establishment date of the oldest private credit bureau in the countrγ. Public
credit registriesl private bureaus that have been around longer should contain
longer credit histories of finns and thus contain more infonnation for sharing.
However , as Miller (2003) points out, the public registry data function as a kind of
enforcement devise in many countries; with the data on defaults or late payments
erased once loans have been paid. 1n addition , many countries only distribute
current data (e.g

12 Due to confìdentiality concems , the total credit exposure for a borrower is 0庇en aggregated , and the
names ofthe lending institutions are omitted , before the information is distributed (Miller 2003)
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infonnation. Nevertheless , this is an empirical issue that we wiII explore in the
next sect lO n.
3.5. Bank Ownership
As discussed in the theory section , private and foreign ownership in the
banking sector may reduce c0 1Tuption in lending due to a greater motivation in
shaping appropriate managerial incentives , introducing more competition and
maintaining a good reputation. We therefore include two variables to measure the
ownership structure of the banking industry. Foreign Ba l1 k Ovvnersh 伊 is the
fraction of the banking system's assets in banks that are 50% or more owned by
foreign investors. Private Bank Ownership is the fraction of the banking system's
assets in banks that are 50% or more owned by private investors. In the regression
analysis , the omitted group is state-owned banks.
3.6. Additionα 1 Bank Controls
We also control for Deposit lnsurance , Bank Accounting and Creditor Rights.
The first two variables are from BCL (2006) and the third one is from DMS
(2007). Deposit lnsurance indicates whether there is an explicit deposit insurance
scheme (Yes= 1, N 0=0) and , if not, whether depositors were fully compensated the
last time a bank failed (Yes=l , No=O). The index ranges from 0 to 2. BCL (2006)
point out that deposit insurance intensifies the moraI hazard problem in banking
because depositors no longer face the risk of losing their savings , which
diminishes their incentives to and efforts at monitoring bank activities. Hence ,
higher values of this index indicate less private monitoring. Bank Accou l1 tÎng
measures whether the income statement includes accrued or unpaid interest or
principal on perfonning and nonperfonning loans and whether banks are required
to produce consolidated financial statements. A higher value indicates more
infonnative bank financial statements. The Creditor Riσhts index measures the
。
powers possessed by secured lenders in a bankruptcy in four respects (DMS ,
2007). First, it measures whether there are restrictio l1 s, such as creditor consent,
for a debtor to file in reorganization. Second , whether secured creditors are able to
seize their collateral after the reorganization petition is approved. Third , whether
secured creditors are paid first out of the proceeds from 1iquidating a bankrupt finn.
Last , whether the management retains administration of its prope討y pending the
resolution of reorσanization. The index ranσes
from 0 to 4. with hiσher values
E
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3.7. Firm Characteristics and Controls
We include two dummy variables that identify a finn's ownership type.
Dummy variable Government equals 1 if any govemment agency or state body has
a financial stake in the ownership of a fir油， and 0 otherwise. State ownership of a
finn may reduce briberγpayments due to stronger bargaining power and better
political cOlU1 ections than is the case for private finns (Svensson , 2003). In
addition , the govemment may direct banks to provide policy loans to SOEs due to
soft budget constraints. If so , state- owned companies have less incentive to bribe
bank officials. Dummy variable Foreign equals 1 if any foreign investor has a
financial stake in the ownership of a finn , and 0 otherwise. Foreign ownership of
the finn is expected to be associated with fewer briberγpayments because local
govemments are typically wi Il ing to provide be社er treatment to attract foreign
direct investmen t. 1n addition , companies with foreign ownership may have
various altemative channels in obtaining funds (e.g. , foreiσn capital markets or
simply by borrowing from foreign partners or the parent finn).
Previous literature (La Porta, Silanes , Shleifer, and Vishny , 1999 , 2000 , 2002)
emphasizes the importance of the legal environment and contract enforcement to
c。中 orate govemance , firrn valuation , and reinvestment decisions. Similarly , the
legal environment and contract enforcement may have potential impacts on
co叮uption in lending. A good legal environment would increase the cost and
reduce the ability of a govemment official to extract rents from enterprises.
Similarly , we expect a good legal environment would increase the cost of
co甘uption in bank lending. In our study , the empirical analysis includes two
variables related to the legal environment and contract enforcemen t. The first
variable is based on a question that asks about the fairness and impartiality of the
court system in resolving business disputes (Court Fairness). The second variable
is based on a question that asks about the enforceability of a court's decision (Law
E份rcemenf). The survey offers respondents six choices: 1 (never) , 2 (seldom) , 3
(sometimes) , 4 (frequently) , 5 (usuaUy) , and 6 (always). A larger number
represents a better system in terms of faimess and enforceability.
Jn addition to the variables discussed above , we include several other
enterprise-level controls. Firm Size is measured
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c1 assification variables are included in the analysis. For the sake of brevity , the
coefficients of the industry classification variables are not repo此ed in the tables ,
but are available upon reques t.
3.8. Countly Controls
The empirical analysis also includes several country-level variables to control
for differences in economic development and institutions across countries. Since
Svensson (2005) finds evidence that higher GDP per capita is related to less
con.uption , we include this variable in our analysis. Economic and political
institutions , to the degree they restrict market and political competition , could
influence the extent of corγuption in a country. We use the variables Openness
(imports as a share of GDP) and Democracy (l ong-term democracy from 1950 to
2000) from Triesman (2000) to capture these institutional factors. Furthermore , we
include a series of other political and institutional quality indexes as a check on the
robustness of the results. The World Govenlance lndexes (Kaufinann et a 1., 1999)
are constructed based on 276 individual variables taken from 31 different sources
produced by 25 different organizations. The indexes measure different dimensions
of govemance , which can be summarized as follows:
(1) Voice and accountability (Voice) - the extent to which a country' s citizens are
able to participate in selecting their govemment , as well as the extent to which
they enjoy freedom of expression , freedom of association, and a free media.
(2) Goνernment effectiveness (Government EfJ告cti叫一 the quality of public
services , the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence
from political pressures , the quality of policy formulation and implementation,
and the credibility of the govemmer前 's commitment to such policies.
(3) Rule 01law (LA 的一 the extent to which 、agents have confidence in and abide
by the rules of society , and in particular, the quality of contract enforcement,
the police , and the coulis , as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
(4) Control of CorrLi ption (Control 01 Corruption) - the extent to which public
power is exercised for private ga泊， including both petty and grand forms üf
COlTuption , as well as “ capture" of the state by elites and private interests.
Higher values indicate better control of corruption.
The indices are used altematively in our different models. The empirical
results are robust to the inclusion of these additional variables.
The correlations among the banking variables and finn-characteristic variables
are presented in Table 3.
[Table 3 here]
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As can be seen from the table , multicollinearity is not a serious problem for
the banking variables and finn-level variables. Most of the correlation coefficients
are below 0 .3, which makes us comfortable to include these variables in the
models simultaneously.
4. Empirical Results

4.1. Banking Competition and Corruption in Lending
To explore the impact of bank competition on corruption in lending, we
assume a finn' s latent response can be represented as follows:
Bank Corruption,.} = α+β'Bω lk Co mpetilion MeasuresJ + α IState， .J + α 2 Foreig n'.J
+α3 Exporfe們 J + α4FMStet j +αJndusη DUn7mies' .J

(1)

+θ'AfGcro ConIrolsj+EJJ

where the i and j subscripts indicate firm and country , respectively. The bankcompetition measures and country-control variables are as defined in the previous
section. Unlike the latent variable , the observed dependent variable ,
Bank Corruption' .J is a polychotomous variable with a natural order. Specifically, a
finn classifies corruption in lending into 4 categories , with 3 threshold
parameters ， 人. We therefore use the ordered probit model to estimate the λparameters together with the regression coefficients simultaneously. We use the
standard maximum likelihood estimation with heteroskedasticity robust standard
errors. The basic results are reported in columns (1 )-(4) of Table 4.
[Table 4 here]
As BCL (2006 , p.238) point out, questions arise as to whether this type of
equation should be estimated using clustering or no t. When clustering the standard
errors by country , observations are not restricted to be independent within
countries; rather, observations are required to be independent across countries. The
assumption of clustering seems more reasonable in our context. We therefore
follow BDL (2006) with clustering the standard errors by country and repeat the
analysis with the results reported in columns (5)-(8) of Table 4. As can be seen ,
the coefficients are the same but less significant when we allow for clustering by
country. The magnitude of the ordered probit coefficients cannot be simply
interpreted as the marginal effects of a one-unit increase in the independent
variables on the dependent variable , although the sign and statistical significance
of the coefficients are similar to the linear regression interpretations. We quantify
the magnitude of the impact on an average firm when we discuss the results in
Table 6 below.
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In Table 4 , the most important finding is that banking competition reduces
corruption in lending. As can be seen in the table , the còefficients of Bank
Concentration (Deposit) and Bank Concentration μ sset) are positive and
statistically significant at the 1% level in most model specifications , suggesting
that increased concentration (i .e. , less competitiveness) results in a more severe
problem of corruption in lending. The coefficients of Ently Barrier are positive
and statistically significant at the 5 0/0 level or less in all model specifications. The
coefficients of Application Den ied are positive and marginally significant after
clustering the standard errors by country. All these results strongly support our
theoretical hypothesis that lower entry ba叮 iers and less stringent entry restrictions
reduce corruption in lending.
Also consistent with our hypothesis , the coefficients of Foreign Bank
Ovvnersh 加 are negative and statistically significant in all model specifications.
The coefficients of Private Bank Own ersh 伊 are negative but only statistically
significant in the models without clustering by country. These results show some
support of our hypothesis that greater private and foreign ownership in a country's
banking industry reduce co汀uption in lending.
Furthennore , as we expected , the coefficients of Court Fairness and Law
Enforcement are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level , indicating
that a better legal environment and contract enforcement help reduce corruption in
lending. Finn characteristics also have some impact on corruption in lending.
Specifically , in a l1 specifications , state-owned finns and foreign-owned finns are
less likely to rate bank corruption as an obstacle to growth. This finding is
consistent with the prior expectation that finns that have more govemment
connections , soft budget constraints and stronger bargaining power suffer less
from co汀uption. Firm Size is negatively related to corruption in lending , but only
statistically significant in the models without clustering by country. Exporting
finns are associated with less corruption in lending，的 indicated by the negative
and statistically significant coefficients in all model specifications. Regarding the
other macro controls , creditor rights is negatively associated with corruption in
lending , but only statistically signifìcant in the models without cl
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4.2. J，可ormation Sharing, Competition and Corruption in Lending
1n Table 5, we add to the regressions in Table 4 the five measures of
infonnation sharing: the existence of a public credit registry , the existence of a
private bureau , the extemal auditing and disclosure of a firm 's financial statements ,
the age of the public credit registry and the age of the private bureau. The model
can be expressed as follows:
Bank Corruption ,.) = α+β， Bank Co npelition Measures) + δ 'Info rmatioll Sharing Measures)
+α ISfate，.) +a ]Foreign ,.) + 叭 Expο的1:j+ 叫 Firm Si~e， .j
+α I IndusllY Dummies人) +θ'λlacro CO l1 trols j

(2)

+ &, .)

The empirical results are presented in Table 5. The robust standard errors are
clustered by country.
[Table 5 here]
As can be seen from Table 5, the existence of a private bureau significantly
reduces corruption in lending , as indicated by the negative and statistically
significant coefficients of Private Bw吧。 u in all model specifications. In contrast ,
the coefficients of Public Credit Registry are not statistica l1 y significant. This is
probab1y due to the nature of public credit registries in contrast to private bureaus.
As we discussed ea r1 ier , the infonnation available from public credit registries
consists mainly of credit data above a certain thresho1d (minimum 10an size) and is
disseminated in consolidated fonn (no details on individual loans). The private
credit bureaus, in contrast, offer details on individual loans and merge the credit
data with other data from other sources (e.g. , courts , tax authorities , and financial
statements) , though they are 1ess comprehensive in coverage. The empirical
evidence shows that private bureaus play a more effective role in reducing the
infonnation gap between lenders and borrowers , and consequently corruption in
lending. The coefficients of Firm Auditing are negative and statistica l1 y significant
at the 1% level in all model specifications , indicating that more accurate
information disclosure lowers corruption in lending. Overall, the results strongly
support our hypothesis that infonnation sharing reduces corruption in lending.
We also include the age of public credit registries and the age of private
bureaus in the models and find that the age of private bureaus is negatively and
statistically associated with corruption in lending, which bolsters our earlier
finding by showing that the infonnation-sharing amount is negatively related to
bank corruption. In contrast , the coefficient of public registry age is not
statistica l1 y significant. As we discussed ea r1 ier, this is probably due to the nature
of public credit registries being used mainly as a kind of enforcement device in
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many countries. Only current data are distributed and the data on defaults or late
payments are erased once they have been paid. Therefore , the public credit
registries do not offer a historical record of a borrower's credit behavior (Miller ,
2003). It is therefore not su中 rising to find that the age of the public credit registry
is not associated with corruption in lending.
1n columns (5)-(6) , we include the key variables of banking competition and
information sharing into the models simultaneously. As can be seen , the empirical
results are very similar to our previous findings that information sharing and
banking competition are associated with less coπuption in lending.
The other variables that are included also yield similar results. Foreign Bank
Ownership and Priνate Bank Ow nership are negatively and statistically
siεnificantly associated with corruption in lending. The coefficients of both Fair
Court and Law Enforcement are negative and statistically significant at the 1%
level in a11 models , indicating that a better legal environment and contract
enforcement reduce corruption in lending. State-owned firms and foreign-owned
finns suffer less from corruption in lending in a11 model specifications. Exporting
firms are associated with less corruption in lending, as indicated by the negative
and statistically significant coefficients in a11 model specifications.
The effect of competition and infonnation sharing on corruption in lending is
not only statistically significant, but also economically significan t. 1n order to
demonstrate the magnitude of the impacts of information sharing and competition
on bank corruption , we use model (5) in Table 5 to quantify the effect that
inforrnation sharing and competition have on the probability that corruption in
lending is rated as an obstacle to firm growth. Specifically , we compute the change
in the probability that a finn rates corruption of bank officials as no obsta c\ e (a
minor obstacle , a moderate obstacle , or a major obstacle) due to a change in the
bank competition and infonnation sharing variables for an average finn. The
empirical results ofthis i11ustrative exercise are presented in Table 6.
[Table 6 here]
As can be seen , the magnitude of the economic impacts is quite large. For
instance , the estimates imply that an one standard deviation increase in banking
concentration would lead to a 4.3 percentage point increase in the probabili
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growth increases by 19.6 percentage points and the probability that a finn rates
bank COlTuption as not an obstacle to firm growth decreases by about 30
percentage points. The effects are quite substantial given that about 12% of the
finns in the sample report that corruption in lending is a major obstacle to their
growth and about 58% of the finns say that bank co叮uption is not an obstacle for
growth.
Similarly , the estimates imply that a one standard deviation increase in
Application Denied would lead to a 3 percentage point increase in the probability
that a finn rates bank corruption as a major obstacle and a 4.8 percentage point
decrease in the probability that a finn rates bank corruption as not an obstacle to
finn growth. A one standard deviation increase in Entry Barrier would lead to a
5.1 percentage point increase in the probability that a finn rates bank corruption as
a major obstacle and a 8 percentage point decrease in the probability that a finn
rates bank corruption as not an obstacle to finn growth. Again , a11 these effects are
quite substantial given that only about 12% of the firms in the sample report that
corruption in lending is a major obstacle to their growth and about 58% of the
finns report that bank corruption is not an obstacle for growth.
Regarding the dummy variables , we calculate the discrete change in the
probability that that a finn rates bank corruption as an obstacle to growth due to a
change in the dummy variable from 0 to 1. The existence of a private bureau
would lead to a 4.1 percentage point decrease in the probability that that a firm
rates bank corruption as a major obstacle. The disclosure of audited financial
statements would lead to a 3 .3 percentage point decrease in the probability that
that a finn rates bank corruption as a major obstaçle. The existence of a deposit
insurance scheme would result in a 2.8 percentage pòint increase in the probability
that that a finn rates bank corruption as a major obstacle. The presence of foreign
and govemment ownership would result in 3 .4 and 1.6 percentage point decreases
in the probability that that a finn rates bank corruption as a major obstacle ,
respectively.
5. Robustness Tests
5.1. Probit Analysis and Instrument Variable Analysis
The fact that we do not have a balanced distribution of responses across the
four categories of answers regarding corruption of bank lending might invalidate
the ordered probit estimates or a few outliers in one of the categories with a small
number of responses could exert an undue influence on the results (see BDL ,
2006). In order to allow us to use a comparatively balanced distribution of
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responses and .lower the likelihood that idiosyncratic 叮叮n responses are biasing
the results , wè follow BDL (2006) in constructing a bank co汀uption dummy
(Corruption DU l11l11y ) that takes on the value of zero if “ no obstacle" and one if the
finn 's response is “ minor", “moderate" or “ major". 13 We use this lending
con'uption dummy as the dependent variable and repeat the entire analysis with the
probit regressions. The results are reported in columns (l)一 (3) ， Table 7.
[Table 7 here]
As can be seen in Table 7 , the results are very similar to our previous findings.
The coefficients of Banking Concentration , Ently Barrier and Application Denied
are positive and statistically significant in all model specifications , indicating that
banking competition reduces the likelihood that a finn rates bank co汀uption as an
obstacle. We also evaluate the marginal effect on an average finn at the median
values of the independent variables. For instance , a 10 percentage point increase
in Bank Concentration will increase the probability that a finn rates bank
corruption as an obstacle by 4 percentage points. A 10 percentage point increase in
Application Denied wi lI increase the probability that a finn rates bank corruption
as an obstacle by 1.2 percentage points. A one standard deviation increase in Ently
Barrier would result in a 2.7 percentage point increase in the probability that a
finn rates bank corruption as an obstacle. All these results confinn our finding thût
greater banking competition , in tenns of lowering concentration , lowering entrγ
barriers and imposing less stringent entrγrestrictions ， reduces corruption in
lending.
明1 ith respect to the infonnation-sharing variable , the existence of a pri vate
bureau is negatively associated with the corruption in lending. The existence of a
public registry , however , does not have a significant impact on the probability that
a finn rates bank con'uption as an obstacle. Finn infonnation disclosure reduces
the probability that a finn rates bank corruption as an obstacle. Regarding the
marginal effect evaluated at the median value of the independent variables , the
existence of a private bureau and firm infonnation disclosure reduces the
probability that a film rates bank corruption as an obstacle by 13 and 12
percentage points , respectively. 1n addition , both private and foreign ownership of
bank are negatively associated with the probability of co甘upt

13 ln our sal11 p 怡、 5 8 % of fìnn s responded th at corrupt ion in bank lendin g is not a signifìcant barri er to
fìr l11 g ro \叫 h ， while 42% indi cated th at bank corruption is an obstac le , with sO l11 e indi cating it is a min 肘，
moderate , or major obstacle.
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Similarly , both the presence of govemment and foreign ownership reduce the
probability that a finn rates bank corruption as an obsta c1 e. The existence of a
Deposit Insw戶ance Scheme increases the probability that an average firm rates
bank corruption as an obstac1 e by about 10 percentage points , which echoes the
finding by BDL (2006). Overa l1, the results provide illustrative evidence of the
potential magnitude of the importance of our findings on competition and
infonnation.
1n our study , the potential for endogeneity being a problem is less of a concem
than in pure cross-country analysis because we are examining the impact of
banking-market competition and the existence of infonnation-sharing agencies on
individual finns. It seems unlikely that an individual finn's view about corruption
in lending will influence nation-wide banking competition and infonnationsharing schemes ((BCL , 2006). Even though there may be feedback from the
corporate sector to policy making: if high levels of co汀uption in lending do
generate calls for more banking competition and infonnation shari時， the
empirical relationship between banking competitio n/ infonnation sharing should be
positive. However , we find a negative relationship between banking
competition/infonnation sharing and corruption in lending. Furthennore , among
the countries with information-sharing schemes , more than 85% of them set up the
schemes 3 or more years prior to our sample period.
Nevertheless , we conduct some robustness tests using instrumental variable
probit analysis. 14 The empirical results are presented in column (4) 一 (6)， Table 7.
We base the selection of instrumental variables on the theoretical and empirical
work in the law , institution and finance literature (Acemoglu and 10hnson , 2005 ,
BDL , 2003 , Easterly and Levine , 1997 , LLSV , 1998 , "1999). From the law and
finance perspective , LLSV (1 999) and BDL (2003) show that the historically
detennined differences in legal traditions help explain intemational differences in
financial systems today. Moreover, legal origin can be thought of as “ exogenous"
because it was imposed by colonial power in many emerging countries (Acemoglu
and 10hnson, 2005; LLSV , 1999). We therefore include legal origin (English ,
French) 的 instrumental variables for the banking competition measures using data
from DMS (2007). The English legal origin in c1 udes the common law of England
an

14 To our knowledge, the instrurnental variable estirnators have not been developed for the ordered
probit anal ys is used in the earlier section.
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environment in shaping the political and tìnancial institutional development
(Acemoglu et a I., 2001 , 8eck et a l., 2003). 8eck et a l. (2003) find strong evidence
that geographical endow l11 ent has substantial il11 pacts on the fonnation of longlasting institutions that shape financial develop l11 ent. We therefore follow 8DL
(2005 , 2006) in using latitude 1S as an instrumental variable for the competition
17
16
and information-sharing measures. We also include the ethnic fractionalization
as an instrumental variable because it has been found that economies with greater
ethnic diversity tend to choose institutions that allow those in power to expropriate
resources from others (8DL 2003 , 2006). Lastly , it is also reported that a country ' s
cu 1ture heritage , as proxied by religion composition , has a significant impact on
shaping its political and tìnancial institutions (LLSV , 1999 , Stulz and Williamson ,
2003). In model 6 (column 6 , table 7) , we therefore in c1 ude religion composition
as additional IVs.
As can be seen from the table , the empirical resu 1ts are rather robust. The
coeftìcients of Banking Concentration remain positive and statistically significant
in a11 model specifications , indicating that banking competition reduces the
likelihood that a finn rates bank corruption as an obstacle. The coefficients of
Entry Barrier and Application Denied are also positive and statistically significant
across the model specitìcations. All these results bolster our finding that banking
competition , in tenns of lowering concentration , lowering entry barriers and
imposing less stringent entry restrictions , is associated with less corruption in
lending. As regarding the infonnation variable , the empirical result is also
consistent with our previous tìndings. The existence of a private bureau reduces
the probability that a finn rates bank corruption as an obsta c1 e. Again , we do 110t
tìnd a significant relation between the existence of a public registry and corruption
in lending. In addition , the coeftìcient of finn infom1ation disclosure remains
negative though it is not statistically significant.
Regarding the control variables , the private and foreign ownership of the
banking industry are negatively associated with corruption in lending. The
presence of govemment and foreign ownership is negatively associated with the
probability that a finn rates bank corruptio l1 as an obstacle. Moreove

的 The abso lute value of the latitude of the co unt巾， scaled to take a va lue betwee n 0 and 1, is from
LLSV ( 1999)
16 We did not use the rn ortality rati o pro posed by Acernoglu and Johnson (2001) because it has a srnall
oyerl ap in countries cornpared with the sample we are using
" We use the avera!!e va lue of ft ve different indi ces of ethnical fracti onali zati on. The data are frorn
Easterly and Levine (1997).
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regressions , which is consistent with our theoretical hypothesis. Overall , the
results are very consistent with our previous findings and predictions.
5.2. More Country Controls
Next , we address the issue of potential omitted variables. Since the overall
quality of the institutional environment might influence corruption in lending , we
include a series of macro-institutional indexes in our model to test the robustness
of the results.
We control for Democracy (l ong-tenn democracy from 1950 to 2000) and
Openness (i mports as a share of GDP) , using data from Triesman (2000).
Furthennore , we include a series of political and institutional quality indexes to
check the robustness of the results. The World Govemance Indexes compiled by
Kaufmann et a l. (2006) are used to capture different aspects of the institutional
environment (voice and accountability , govemment effectiveness , rule of law , and
control of corruption). The detailed definitions of the indexes are presented in
18
section 3. Because some indexes are highly correlated with each other, we
include the indexes individually in the models. The results are presented in Table 8.
[Table 8 here]
As can be seen from the table , the empirical results are highly consistent with
our previous findings. The competition and infonnation-sharing variables are
significantly and negatively associated with corruption in lending. Most of the
mäcrö-control variables are not statistically significant , indicating that the legal
environment and institution quality are well controlled for by the finn-level , legalenvironment variables and other macro-control variables like GDP per capita.
6. Conclusion
Our paper examines whether bank competition and infonnation sharing help
curtail corruption in bank lending. We use three unique datasets: (1) the World
Bank Business Environment Survey (2000) which contains direct firm-level
infonnation on the degree to which corruption in bank lending represents an
obstacle to firms ; (2) the data complied by Barth et a l. (2006) which provides
detailed infonnation about various dimensions of bank competition and regulation
across different countries during 2001-2003; and (3) the data from Djankov et
a1.(2007) on public credit registries and private credit bureaus in 129 countries
during 1978-2003. We obtain two main empirical results. First， σreater
competition in banking helps to curtail corruption in bank lending. Second,
18 Kaufmann et a l. (2006) compile the world govemance indicators from 1996 to 2005 . We use the
value of the index for 1999 in our analysis.
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informati on sharing v ia credit registries/bureaus helps reduce corruption in bank
lending.
Beyond these two important results , wë find that govemment. and foreignowned finns as well as exporting finns tend to be subject to less lending
corruption; objective courts and better law enforcement tend to reduce lending
corruption; greater private and foreign ownership of the banking industry are
associated with more integrity in lending; and that more private monitoring of
banks helps to curtail lending corruption. Both our major findings and other results ,
moreover , pass a number of robustness tests.
Our findings complement the recent , pioneering work of Beck, DemirgucKunt and Levine (2006) which is to our best knowledge the only existing study of
the detenninants of corruption in obtaining bank loans by finns. Using datasets (1)
and (2) mentioned above , they examine the role of bank supervision in combating
lending corruption. They find that strengthening traditional official supervision
does not have a positive impact on the integrity of bank lending , but instead , a
supervisory strategy that focuses on empowering private monitoring of banks
through the disclosure of accurate and timely infonnation reduces lending
corruption. We focus on the role of market institutions , in particular on market
competition and infonnation-sharing mechanisms in the form of credit bureaus
(and public credit registries) in reducing bank-lending corruption. Controlling for
finn characteristics and including bank and macro controls , we find that
competition among banks and infonnation sharing among lenders (especially via
private credit bureaus) are both important in reducing bank corruption.
Our findings have important policy i1J1 plications. First , our resu It s show that
one positive and important aspect of bank" competition is in reducing corruption ,
apart from any impacts on banking efficiency and stability. The finding regarding
information sharing also sheds light on the positive role that market institutions
like private credit bureaus can play in reducing corruption in bank lending.
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Table 1: Dcfinitions and Sources of Variables
Variable

Defìnition

Original Sources

8ank Corruptio l1

Corruption of bank officials as an obstacle for the operation
and growth of your busi ness. (1-110 obstacle、 2- minor
obstacle ，于 a moderate obstacle ‘ 4-major obstacle)

World 8usiness
Environment Survey
(W8ES、 2000)

8ank
Concentratìon
(Deposit)

The fraction oftotal deposits held by the five largest banks in
the industry. The data are compiled based on a survey of
banking regulators in 150 countrìes in 2001

8arth et al. (2006)

8ank
Concentration
(Asset)

The fraction oftotal assets held by the five largest banks in
the industry. The data are compiled based on a survey of
banking regulators in 150 countries in 2001

8arth et al. (2006)

Entry 8arrier

Entry into 8anking Requirement , which is a variable
developed based on eight questi ons regarding whether various
types of leg訓 submission are required to obtain a banking
license. Which ofthe following are legally required to be
submitted before issuance ofthe banking license? (1 )Draft bylaws? (2)lntended organization chart? (3) Financial
projections for fìrst three years? (4) Financial infonnation on
main potential shareholders? (5) 8ackground/ex perience of
future di rectors? (6) 8ackground/experience of future
managers? (7) Sources of funds to be disbursed in the
capitalization ofnew bank? (8) Market differentiation
intend ed for the new bank? The index ranges 什om 0 (Iow
entry requirement) to 8 (high entry requirement). Higher
values indicate greater stringency

8arth et al. (2006)

Application
Oenied

The percentage 10 which applications 10 enter banking are
denied in the past fìve years. The data are compiled based on
a survey of banking regulators in 150 countries in 2001

8arth et al. (2006)

Foreign 8ank
Ownership

Th e 什action

ofthe banking system's assets in Ihe banks that
are 50 percent or more owned by for巴ign investors. The data
are compil ed based on a survey of banking regulators in 150
countries in 2001

8arth et al. (2006)

Private 8 ank
Ownership

The fraction of the banking system's assets in the banks that
are 50 p巴rcenl or more ow ned by private investors. The data
are compiled based on a survey 10 banking regulators in 150
countries in 2001

8arth et al. (2006)

Public Credit
Registry

The variable equals one ifa public credit registry operates in
the country by the end of 1999 , zero otherwise. A public
registry is defined as a database owned by public authorities
(usua ll y the central bank or banking supervisor authority) that
co ll ects info n11ation on the standing of borrowers in the
tìnancial sys tem and makes it available to financial
lnstltutl ons

Djankov et al. (2007)

Years of establishment since the starting date ofthe public
registry

Djankov et a l. (2007)

Public
Age

R 巴gistry

33

Variable

Detìnition

Original Sources

Private Bureau

The variable equals one ifa private credit bureau operates in
the count可 by the end of 1999 , zero otherwise. A private
bureau is detìned as a private commercial fìrm that maintains
a database on the standing of borrowers in the fìnancial
system , and its primary role is to facilitate exchange of
information amongst banks and tìnancial institutions

Djankov et al. (2007)

Private Bureau
Age

Years of establishment since the starting date of oldest private
credit bureau in the country

Djankov et al. (2007)

Firm Auditing

Does the tìrm provide its shareholders with annual tìnancial
statements that have been reviewed by an extemal auditor
(Yes斗， No=O)? Higher value indicates more information
disclosure of the tìnn

World Business
Environment Survey
引f13 ES ， 2000)

Deposit Insurance

This variable indicates whether there is an explicit deposit
insurance scheme (Yes=l , No=O) and , ifnot, whether
depositors were fully compensated the last time a bank failed
(Yes= 1, No=O). The index ranges from 0 to 2. Higher values
indicate less private monitoring

Barth et al. (2006)

Bank Accοunting

Whether the income statement includes accrued or unpaid
interest or principal on perforrning and nonperforrning loans
and whether banks are required to produce consolidated
tìnancial statements. Higher value indicates more inforrnative
bank accoun t.

Barth et al. (2006)

The index measures the power of secured lenders in
bankruptcy. A score of one is assigned when each of the
following 吋刮ltS of secured lenders are defìned in laws and
regulations : First , there are restrictions , such as cr它 ditor
consent, for a debtor to tìle reorganization. Second, secured
creditors are able to seize their cοIlateral a仇er the
reorganization petition is approved. Third , secured creditors
are paid first out of the pro臼eds of liquidating a bankrupt
firm. Last, management does not retain administration of its
property pending the resolution ofthe reorganization. The
index ranges from 0 to 4. Hiεher val ue indicates stronεer
creditor rights

Djankov et al. (2007)

Govemment

Dummy variable equals to 1 if any govemment agency or
state body has a fìnancial stake in the ownership ofthe tìrrn , 0
otherwise.

World Business
Environment Survey
(WBES , 2000)

Foreign

Dummy variable equals to I if any foreign company and
individual has a tinancial stake in the ownership ofthe fìrrn

Wo r1 d Business
Environment Su

Law Enforcement

"ln resolving b凶 iness dispute , do you believe yo ur country'
court system to be decision enforced ," categorical variable , 0never, I-seld om ‘ 2-sometimes ， 3- frequent旬， 4-usually , 5always. Hi gher value indicates better law enforcement

World Busi ness
Environment Survey
(WBES , 2000)

Creùitor

Riζhts
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Yariab le

Definiti on

Original Sources

Fair Court

"In resolving husiness di s put巳 d o yo u beli eve yo ur country ‘
court system to be fair and imparti al," categorical va riabl e. 0never, l-se ldom, 2-sometimes ， 于 rrequently， 4-u s u a l 旬 ， 6always. Hi gher va lue indi cates better court quality

World Business
Environlllent Survey
(WBES ‘ 2000)

Competiti on

Regarding yo ur fi rm's 111 句 o r prod uct line、
competitors do you face in yo ur market?

World Business
Environmen t Survey
(WBES , 2000)

Exporter

Thi s dummy va ri ab le takes on the value 1 iffìrrn
otherwise.

Firm Size

Nature loga rithm offinn sales.

World Business
Environment Survey
(W BES , 2000)

fnfl ation

3 year average percentage inflation , GDP deflato r.

World Development
Tndicators (WDI)

GDP per Capita

Logarithm of ~'Toss national product per capita in 1999.

World Development
1ndicators (WDI)

Yoi ce and
Accountability

The indicator which measures the extent to which a count 旬 's
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government ,
as we ll as freedom of expression、 freedom of association , and
free media. The value of year 1999 is used in thi s study
Hi gher values mean greater political ri ghts

Kaufmann et al. (2006)

Govemment
Effectiveness

The indicator which measure the quality of public services ,
the quality ofthe civil se rvice and the degree ofits
independence from political press ures ‘ the quality ofpolicy
formul ati on and implementati on, and the credibi lity ofthe
governm ent' s commitment to such policies. The value of year
1999 is u s 巴d in thi s study. Hi gher values mean hi gher quality
ofpublic and civil service

Kaufmann et al. (2006)

Rule of Law

The indicator which meas ure the extent to whi ch agents have
confide nce in and abide by the rules of society 、 and in
parti cul ar the quality of contract enforcement‘ the police , and
the cou t1. s, as well as the likelihood ofcrirne and violence
The value of year 1999 is used in thi s study. Hi gher values
mean stronger law and order

Kaufmann et al. (2006)

Control of
Corruption

The indicator whi ch measure the extent to whi ch public power Kaufmann et al. (2 006)
is exercis巴d for private gai n‘ including both petty and grand
forms of corruption ‘ as we ll as “ capture" of the state by el ites
and pri vate interests. The va lue of year 1999 is used in thi s
study. Higher va lues indicate better control of corruption

Democracy

Democrat ic in all years since 1950 as of 2000

Treisman (2000)

Openness

1mports ofgoods and se rvices as % ofGDP, 2000.

World Development
1ndi cators (WDI)
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h ow

many

expo 巾，

0

World Bus iness
Environment Survey
(WBES , 2000)

Table 2: S umm ary Statistics of Key Variah les
Variab le

Observations

Mean

Standard Dev

Mi ni mum

Maximum

Bank Corruption

8032

1. 776

1.050

Govemm ent

7726

0.1 17

0.322

O

Fore ign

7752

0. 192

0.394

O

Competitor

777 1

2.342

0.73 1

O

Fair Court

7385

3 .4 29

1. 435

6

Law Enforcement

7325

3 .4 24

1.4 56

6

Firm Size

7294

10. 174

7.556

0.11

Exporter

4

9

25.33

7609

0.365

0 .4 8 1

O

Bank Concentration (Deposit)

62

0.656

0.19 1

0.21

Bank Concentration (Asset)

64

0.629

0. 188

0.14

Appli cation Denied

52

0.229

0.287

O

Entry Barrier

69

7 .4 64

0.964

Public Registry

77

0 .4 55

0.50 1

O

Pub lic Registry Age

66

9.015

15.323

O

Pri vate B ureau

77

0.377

0 .4 88

O

Private Bureau Age

66

8.803

19.118

O

Deposit lnsurance

69

0.696

0 .4 64

O

Bank Accounting

66

3.576

0.583

2

4

Pri vate Bank Ownership

61

42.713

30 .4 05

O

95 .2

Foreign Bank Ownershi p

62

38 .567

30.398

1. 9

Creditor Rights

77

1. 935

1.104

GDP per Capita (\og)

81

7 .4 38

1.3 75

4.58

10 .3 8

Voice and Accountability

81

0.013

0.823

- 1. 72

1. 38

Govemment Effect iveness

81

0.018

0.897

-1. 42

2.57

Ru\e ofLaw

81

-0.064

0.864

-1. 34

2.04

Control of Corruption

81

-0.086

0.935

-1.3 4

2 .4 8

Democracy

78

0.\4 1

0.350

36

8

O

O

65

98

100
4

Tab le

3: Co rre lat io n Mat rix o f Kcy B a n ki n g Var iah les (Pa n e l A)
Concenlrali on COllcenlralion
(Dq~os i t)

(A ss巳t)

Enlry
ßa rri er

Enlry

Public

D巳 nièd

Re已 iSlry

Privale
Regi slry

Finn
Audiling

Privale
8ank

Foreign Dcposit
ßank Insurance

8ank

Credilor

Ac 已。 unl l ll巴

Righ t

ß ank
Co nιc ntrallon

(D eposit)

ßank
Concenlrali on
(Asset)

0.9335*

E nl 仰 ßarrier

-0.0850*

-0.0799*

Applicalion
Denied

-0.0940*

-0.003 1

-0. 1417*

Pub lic
Registry

0.0482*

0.19 18*

-0.0945* 0. 1731*

Pri vate
ßureau

-0.1685*

-0.1226'

-0 .0137* 0.0584*

0.1568*

-0.0665*

-0.0058

-0.0404 * 0 .0915*

0.0777*

Pr叭' ale ßank
Owncrship

-0.2 132*

-0.2050*

-0.0596* -0. 1029* 0.0439*

Foreign ßank
Owm:rship

0.3163*

0.3528*

。 19 11 *

Depos it
Insurance

-0.0388*

-0.0402*

-0.0666" -0. 143 1" -0.06 18* 0.167 1* 0.0252*

ßank
Accounti ng
Disclosure

-0. 1869*

-0 . 1712*

0.0019

-0.0785*

0.000 1

-0.006 1

0.0377*

0.0 126

m

0.2206*

Auditing

Credilor
Ri ght

Ta ble

3:

0.2421 * 0.0855*

-0.0751 * -0.0366*

0.0077

0.0049

-0.0507* -0.7 106*
0.0829* -0.0 151

0.1646*

0.0609*

0.0826* 0. 1447* -0.1929*

-0.1380* -0. 100U*

-0.0174

0.0645*

0.001

0.1608*

-0.0807*

Co r re lat io n Mat r ix o f F irm Level Va r iab les (Pa n e l B )
Corrupti on

Govemm ent

Foreign

Audit

Competitor

Fair
Court

Law
Enforcement

Firm
Size

Corruption
Govemment

-0.0499*

Foreign

-0.0808*

A udit

-0. 15 10*

0.(1482*

0.1567*

Competitor

。 0982*

-0.0460 *

-0.0964*

-0 . 1026*

-0.0562*

Fair Court

-0. 1519*

0.0617*

。 0574*

0 . 1568*

0 .0076

Law Enforcement

-0.1440*

0.0636*

0.0310*

0.0887*

0.0052

0 .4 70 1*

Firm Size

-0.0948 *

-0.1 153*

0.2453*

0.3480*

-0.3412*

0 . 1254*

0.0512*

Expo 口 e r

-0. 1028*

0.0508*

0.2412*

0 .2368*

-0.0386*

0 .13 10*

0.0566*
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0. 1361*

Exporter

Table 4: Bank Com~e!lti o n and Corruption
協' it h o ut

( 1)

Cuunlry C luslc:: r E t1è: cl

(2)

Wilh

(3)

(4)

(5 )

Co u nl 叭!

(6)

CIUSler Effc:: cl

(7)

(8)

Bunking SeClor l 'ariubles
Bank Con附c巴f附a剖叫ti on叫(Depo
的s圳 10 .846

[0.000]***
Ba叭 Com: en l叫 o n

(Asset)

Enlry 8arrier

[0.000]***

1.2 57

0.846

1.257

[0.000]*"

[0.029]**

[0.003]"*

0.654

0.903

0.654

[0.000]***

[0.000]*"

[0.054]*

0. 166

0.277

[0.000]***

[O.OOOJ*"

A pplicali on Den ied

0.506

Privale 8ank Ownershi p

-0.006
[0.000]***

[0.000]'**
Firm- Ievel

。 1 76

[0.000]***

[0.022]**

0 .4 25

[0.000]*"

Foreign Bank Ownership

0.25

-0.004

[0.020]**

。 1 66

0.277

[0.029]"

[0.005]***

。 506

[0.000]' "
-0.003

0.903

-0.006

[0.008]***
0 .4 25

[0.064]*
-0.006

0.25

[0.1 33]
-0.003

-0.004

[0.000 ] 叫*

[ 0.002 ] 艸*

[0.000]" .

[0.070].

[0.064]*

[0.322]

[0.265 ]

-0.0 1

-0.0 11

-0.0 11

-0.0 1

-0.0 1

-0.0 11

-0.0 11

[0.000]'"

[0.000]***

[0.000]***

[0.0 17]**

[0.016]"

[0.01 1]**

[0.0 18]**

-0.23 1

-0.284

-0.283

I包riables

Government

1-0.233
[0.000)***

Foreign

[0.00 1)'"
Competitor

[0.525]
Fair Co u口

[0.002)“ *
Law Enforceme nt

1-0.096
10 .000)***

Firm Size

[0.002]** *
Exporter

1-0. 137
[0.001 ]***

-0.283

-0.233

-0.23 1

-0.284

[O.OOOj" * [O.OOOJ** '

[0.000]**'

[0.0 16]*'

[0.0 17]**

[0.003]** .

[0.003)** .

-0. 181

-0. 169

-0.174

-0.181

-0.1 66

-0.1 69

-0.1 66

[0.000]***

[0.004) *"

[0.003]***

[0.00 1]**.

[0.000]** '

[ 0.004 ] 抖，

[0.004]***

0.023

0.038

0.04 1

0.0 19

0.023

0.038

0.041

[0.4 26]

[0.252]

[0.2 12]

[0.715)

[0.65 1)

[0.53 1]

[0.4 96]

-0.044

-0.047

-0.046

-0.047

-0.044

-0.047

-0.046

[0.004]***

[0.007]***

[0.008]***

[0.020]**

[0.028)*'

[0.018]"

[0.02 1)**

-0.099

-0.089

-0.092

-0.096

-0.099

-0.089

-0.092

[0.000]***

[0.000]***

[0.000]***

[0.000]"*

[0 . 000 ] 叫 *

[0.00 1] “ *

[ 0.000 ] 抖 *

-0.0 1

-0.0 19

- 0υ 1 8

-0.0 1

-0.01

-0.019

-0.0 18

[0.00 1]***

[0.000]***

[0.000]'**

[0.302]

[0.242]

[0.070].

[0.095]*

-0. 138

-0. 154

-0.1 62

-0. 137

-0.138

-0.154

-0.1 62

[0.00 1]***

[ 0 . 00 1] 抖·

[0.00 1]***

[0.020]**

[0.021]**

[0.011]**

[0.008]** *

-0.038

-0.04 1

-0.036

-0.038

-0.038

-0.04 1

-0.036

[0.044]**

[0 .086]*

[0. 132]

[0.4 94]

[0.4 83]

[0 .5 25]

[0.597]

0.166

。 151

0.109

0. 192

0.166

0.15 1

0. 109

[0 . 000 ] 抖*

[ 0 . 002 ] 叫*

Olher Conlrols
C redi tor Right

1-0.038
[0.050]*'

Deposit [nsurance
(0.000] 叫*

[0.025]"

(0.182]

(0.224]

[0.253]

[0 .4 19)

Olh er Macro-contro ls

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

Ind ustry Du mmies

yes

ves

yes

yes

ves

yes

yes

4395

3568

3568

4349

4395

3568

3568

Observati ons
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8ank corruption is the response to the question "Is the corrupti on of bank offìcials as an obstacle for the
operation and growth of your business (I-no obstacle. 2- minor obstacle , 3- a moderate obs tacle、 4-major
obstacle)". 8ank concentration (Deposit) is the fraction of total deposits held by the tive largest banks in the
industry. 8ank concentration (Asset) is the fracti on of total assets held by the tive largest banks in the industry
Entry barrier measures the entry into banking requiremer吭， which is a variable develop巴d bas巴d on eight
questions regarding whether various types of legal submission are required to obtain a banking license. The
index ranges from 0 (Iow entry requirement) to 8 (high entry requirement). Higher values indicate greater
stringency. Application Denied is the percentage 10 which applications to enter banking are denied in the past
five years. Private 8ank Ownership indicates of the banking system's assets in the banks that are 50 percent or
more owned by private investors. Foreign 8ank Ownership indicates the share of banks own巳d by foreign
investors. Goverηment is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if any govemment agency or state body has a
tinancial stake in the ownership of the fìrrn ‘ o othenvise. Foreign is a dummy variable which equals to I if any
foreign company or individual has a financial stake in the ownership ofthe firrn. Law enforcement is a fìrm level
survey indicator which measures the enforceabil ity of court 's decision with a higher value indicating better law
enforcement. Law enforcement is a tirrn \e vel survey indicator which measures the faimess and impartialness of
court's decision with a higher value indicating more faimess . Finn size is the natural logarithm of firrn sales in
US$. Exporter is a dummy variable that takes on value one ifthe firrn is an exporter and zero otherwise. Creditor
Rights is an index which measures the power of secured lenders in bankruptcy defined in laws and regulations
The index ranges from 0 to 4 with a higher value indicating stronger creditor rights. Deposit Insurance indicates
whether there is an explicit deposit insurance scheme and whether depositors were fully comp巴nsated the last
time a bank failed. Other macro controls (GDP per capita and in f1 ation) and industry dummies are also included
For brevity , the coeflicients are not presented but are available upon reques t. The regressions are run with
ordered probit, which is based on standa
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Tab le 5 : In fo rm a t io n ‘ Co m petitio n a n d Co rr uptio n
(2)
(3)
(1 )
Public Credit Registry
0. 11 1
0.157
0.097
[0 .4 46]
[0.257]
[0 .4 73 ]
Private 8ureau
-0 .4 83
-0 .4 05
-0.318
[0 . 008] 料*
[0.022 ]**
[0.055]*
Public Registry Age
Private 8 ureau Age

-0.006

Finn Auditi ng

(4)
0.006
[0.966]
-0.296
[0.094]*
0.006
[0.22 1]
-0.007

(5)

0.018
[0.909]
-0.357
[0.040]**

[0 . 007]* 抖

[0 . 00 1 ] 抖*

-0.274

-0.224

-0.223

-0.300

-0.285

[ 0 . 00 1] 抖 *

[ 0 . 00 1 ] 叫*

[ 0.00 1] 抖*

[ 0.001 ] 料*

[0 . 000 ] 艸*

8ank Concentration (Deposit)

1.064
[0.004]***

8ank Concentration (Asset)
Entry 8arrier
Application Denied
Private 8 ank Ownership

(6)

0.039
[0.80 1]
-0 .361
[0.043]**

0 .4 54
[0.060]*
-0.003
[0.319]
-0.008

Govemment

[0.003 ] * 抖

[ 0 . 009 ] 抖*

[0 . 000]* 抖

[O.OOO]! 抖

[0 . 003] 料*

Foreign

-0. 167

-0. 13 7

[0 . 00 1] 材*

[0 . 0 1 5] 抖

Competitor
Fair Court

-0.012
[0.805]
-0.048

-0.006
[0.899]
-0.042

-0.129
[0.027]**
0.002
[0.97 1]
-0.041

-0.13
[0.026]* *
-0.007
[0.897]
-0.044

-0.138
[0.026]**
0.018
[0.734 ]
-0.05 1

[0 . 013] 抖

[ 0.032] 叫

[ 0 . 035] 艸

[0 . 0 2 7] 抖

[0.004 ] * 叫

[0 . 005]***

Law Enforcement

-0.097

-0.097

-0.093

-0.093

-0.084

-0.082

[0 . 000 ] 抖*

[ 0.000 ] 抖*

[ 0 . 000]* 抖

[0.000 ] 抖*

[0 . 000 ] 料*

[0 . 000 ] 料*

0.002
[0.868]
-0.204

0.006
[0.600]
-0. 169

0.008
[0.4 46]
-0.146
[0.005]***
-0.033
[0.564]
0.269
[0.031]**
0.054
[0.604]
yes
yes
3,935

0.008
[0.4 57]
-0.154

0.000
[0.984]
-0. 184

0.000
[0 .988]
-0. 176
[0.002]***
-0.049
[0.386]
0.256
[0.015]**
0.15
[0.165]
yes
yes
3,270

Finn Size
Expo鬥 er

Creditor Ri ghts
Depos it Insurance
8ank Accounting Disclosure
Other Macro Controls
Industry Dummies
Observations

-0.006

[0 . 006] 料*

-0.00 1
[0.795 ]
-0.002
[0.574]
-0.278

Foreign 8ank Ownershi p

-0.002
[0.539]
-0.002
[0.527 ]
-0.25 1

0 .211
[0.007]***
0.386
[0.099]*
-0.003
[0.268 ]
-0.007
[0.044]**
-0.29

0.820
[0.042]**
0.235

[0 . 000 ] 料*

[ 0 . 001 ] 抖*

-0 .055
[0.339]
0.225
[0.086]*
0.042
[0.698]
yes
y es
4 ,350

-0 .06
[0.280]
0.237
[0.060]*
0.087
[0.385 ]
yes
yes
4 ,076
40

-0.006

[0 . 020 ] 料

[ 0 . 016 ] 抖

-0.007

-0.006

[0 . 021 ] 抖

[0 . 035 ] 抖

-0 .3 08

-0.304

[ 0 . 002 ] 料*

[ 0.00 1 ] 料*

-0.036
[0.543 ]
0.264

-0.046
[0 .4 45 ]
0.224
[0.032]**
0.147
[0.222]
yes
yes
3,270

[0.026] 抖

0.066
[0.501 ]
yes
yes
3,935

[0 . 030] 材

-0.295
[0.002]***
-0. 14 1
[0.02 1]**
0.015
[0.784]
-0.052

8ank corruption is the response to the question “ Is the corruption of bank officials as an obstacle for the
operation and growth of your business (I-no obstacle、 2- minor obstacle , 3- a moderate obstacle , 4-major
obstacle)". Puhlíc Credít Regístry ís a dummy varíable whích takes on value one íf a public credít regístry
operates in the count 門I by the end of 1999、 zero otherwise. Public Regístry Age is the years of establishment
since the startíng date of the public credit regístry. Private ßureau is a dummy variables whích takes on v31ue
one ifa private credít bureau operates in the country by the end of 1999‘ zero otherwise. Prívate ßureau Age is
the years of establíshment since the startíng date of oldest prívate credit bureau in the country. Fírm audíting ís a
durnmy varíable which takes on value on íf the firm provide its shareholders wíth annual financíal statements
that have been reviewed by an extemal auditor, and 0 otherwise. Higher value indicates more information
disclosure ofthe finn . 8ank concentratíon (Deposit) is the fractíon oftotal deposits held by the five largest banks
in the industry. 8ank concentration (Asset) is the fraction of total assets held by the five largest banks in the
industry. Entry barrier measures the entry into banking requirement , which is a variable developed based on
eight questions regarding whether various types of legal submissíon are required to obtain a bankíng license. The
index ranges from 0 (Iow entry requirement) to 8 (high entry requirement). Hígher values indicate greater
stringency. Applícation Denied is the percentage to which applications to enter banking are denied in the past
tìve years. Private 8ank Ownership indicates of the banking system's assets in the banks that are 50 percent or
more owned by private investors. Foreign Bank Ownership indicates the share of banks owned by foreígn
investors. Goverηment is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if any govemment agency or state body has a
tìnancial stake in the ownership of the firm , 0 otherwise. Foreign is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if any
foreign cornpany or individual has a tìnancial stake in the ownership ofthe finn. Law enforcement is a fìml Ie vel
survey indicator whích measures the enforceability of court's decision with a higher value indicating better law
enforcemen t. Law enforcement ís a firm level survey indicator which measures the faímess and ímpartialness of
court's d 巴cision with a higher va
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Table 6: Magnitude of the Effects: Competition , J nformation and Corruption
Bank Concentration

Application Denied

Entry Barrier

2

3

4
0.043

1 standard dev. increase

-0.067

0.006

0.018

Change from Minimum to Maximum

-0.299

0.025

0.078

0.196

1 standard dev. increase

-0.048

0.004

0.013

0.030

Change from Minimum to Maximum

-0.173

0.002

0.042

0.128

1 standard dev. increase

-0.080

0.007

0.022

0.051

Change from Minimum to Maximum

-0.357

0.081

0.104

0. 171

Private Bureau

Change from 0 10 1

0.071

0.141

-0.025

-0.041

Firm Auditing

Change from 0 to 1

0.057

0.113

-0.018

-0.033

Deposit Insurance

Change 什 om

Oto 1

-0.051

-0.101

0.012

0.028

Govemment

Chanεe

from 0 to 1

0.059

0.117

-0.019

-0.034

Foreign

Change from 0 to 1

0.028

0.056

-0.007

-0.016

The estimation is based on model 5 in table 5. Bank concentration is the fraction oftotal deposits held by the five
Jargest banks in the industry. AppJication Denied is the percentage to which appJications to enter banking are
denied in the past five years. Entry barrier measures the entry into banking requirement, which is a variabJe
developed based on eight questions regarding whether various types of Jegal submission are required to obtain a
banking Jicense. The index ranges from 0 (J ow entry requirement) to 8 (high entry requirement). Higher values
indicate greater stringency. Private Bureau is a dummy variable which takes on vaJue one if a private credit
bureau operates in the country by the end of 1999 , zero otherwise. Firm auditing is a dummy variabJe which
takes on value on if the tìrm provid巴 its shareholders with annual financial statements that have been reviewed
by an extemal auditor, and 0 otherwise. Govemment is a dummy variab le which equals to 1 if any govemment
agency or state body has a financial stake in the ownership of the firm , 0 otherwise. Foreign is a dummy variable
which equals to 1 if any foreign company or individual has a financial stake in the ownership of the tìrm
Numbers in column 1, 2, 3, 4, indicate the change in the probability that an average tìrm rates the corruption of
bank officiaJs as no obsta cJ e, a minor obstacJe, a moderate obstacJ e and a major obstacle, respectively due to the
change ofthe bank competition and information variabJe as indicated in the second coJumn
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Tab le 7 : Pro hi t A n a l )海 i s: Compcti t io n. Informatio n a n d Co rruptio n
(3)
(4)
( 1)
(2)
Pro bit
Bank Concentration (A sset)

Probit

0.936
[0.047 ] 艸

Bank Concentration (Deposi t)

Probi t

rv

0.887
[0.054]*

[ 0.000] 料*

Probit

rv

(5)
Probit

2 .4 35

1. 066
[0 . 024] 抖

1. 1 14

(6)

rv Probit
1.324
[0.0 1 7] 叫

2.395
[0.000]***
1. 174

Private Bureau

0.249
[0.007]***
0.542
[0.058 ]*
0.030
[0.860]
-0 .359
[ 0.043] 艸

[0 . 023 ] 村

Firm Auditing

-0.319

-0 .03 7
[0.647]
-0 .006
[0.052]*
-0.0 10

Ent ry Barrier

0.298
[0.005 ] 抖*

Application Denied

0.629
[0 . 049 ] 叫

0.314
[0.005 ] 抖*

0.699
[ 0.029 ] 抖

Pub lic Regist ry

[0.000 ] 料*

[0 . 000]* 抖

2. 160
[0.0 10]**

[ 0 . 002] 艸*

2.60 1

0.207
[0. 170]
-0.328

[ 0.002 ] 抖*

Governm ent

[0.002] 叫*

[ 0.00 2 ] 抖*

[ 0 . 00 1] 抖*

[ 0 . 002 ] 抖*

[ 0 . 003 ] 料*

[0 . 000 ] 叫*

Forei gn

-0.200

-0. 194

-0. 155

[ 0.00 1] 抖*

10 . 0 1 9 ] 村

0.05 1
[0 .4 46]
-0 .044

0.050
[0 .4 51]
-0.043

0.029
[0.6 18]
-0.038

-0.169
[0.044]**
0.128

-0.246

[ 0 . 00 1] 材*

-0. 192
[0.021 ]**
0 .1 25

[0.027] 艸

[ 0.0 1 7 ] 抖

[0 . 020 ] 抖

[ 0.037] 抖

-0.086

-0.085

-0.093

[0. 0 00] 叫*

[0.000] 叫*

[0.000] 仲*

[0,028]**
0.003
[0.925]
-0.037
[0. 135]

-0.0 16
[0. 125]
-0. 180

-0.016
[0. 126]
-0.17 1

0.007
[0.585]
-0.1 61

Foreign Bank Ownership

Competitor
Fair Court
Law Enforcement
Firm Size
Exporter
C reditor Ri ghts
Deposit Insurance
Bank Accounting Disclos ure
Other Macro-controls
lndu strγDummies

Observations

-0.006
[0.062]*
-0.009

0.983
[ 0.009 ] 料*

-0.005
[0. 160]
-0.010
[0.028]**
-0.3 10

Private Bank Ownership

-0.005
[0.221 ]
-0 .010

0.774
[0.000 ] 叫*

[0 . 027] 抖

[0.031 ] 艸

-0.309

-0.312

[0 . 001] 叫*

[ 0.00 1 ]* 艸

-0.046
[0 .4 84]
0.222
[0. 101 ]
0. 123
[0 .4 28]
yes
yes

-0.047
[0 .468]
0.25 1
[0.075 ]*
0. 107
[0.4 6 1]
yes
yes

3,489

3,489

-0.006
[0.05 1]*
-0.009
[0.109]
-0.349

[0.006 ] 料*

0.003
[0.673]
-0.119
[0.100]

0.057
[0.368]
0.258

-0 .050
[0. 182]
1.4 50

0.009
[0.788]
-0.036
[0.1 58]
0.000
[0.965 ]
-0. 11 9
[0.106]
-0.038
[0.327]
1.5 70

[ 0 . 028 ] 抖

[0 . 000] 抖*

[0 . 000 ] * 料

“

0.177
[0.202]
y es
yes
3 司 270
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-0.008
[0.009]***
-0.0 11
[0.050]*
-0.356

0.271
[ 0.045] 抖

yes
yes
2384

0.154
[0.224]
yes
yes
2384

[ 0.035 ] 抖

-0 .4 17

[0.002 ] 叫*

0. 10 1
[0.08 1]*
0.00 1
[0.981 ]
-0.059
[0.019] 叫

0.007
[0 .4 10]
-0.140
[0.050]**
-0.074
[0 . 043 ] 抖

0.982
[ 0 . 000]* 抖

0.308
[ 0 .021] 叫

yes
yes

2206

Bank Corruption DUITImy is the response to the question "Is the corruption of bank offìcials as an obstacle for
the operation and growth of your business?" , where “ no obstacle" is equal to zero and "minor" ,“ moderate" and
“ major" is equal to one. Bank concentration (Deposit) is the fraction of total deposits held by Ihe tive largest
banks in the industry. Bank concentration (Asset) is Ihe fraction of lotal assets held by the tive largest banks in
the industry. Entry barrier measures the entry into banking requiremen t, which is a variable developed based on
eight questions regarding whether various types of legal submission are required to obtain a banking license. The
index ranges from 0 (Iow entry requirement) to 8 (high entry requirement). Higher values indicate greater
stringency. Application Denied is the percentage to which applications to enter banking are denied in the past
five years. Public Credit Registry is a dummy variable which takes on value one if a public credit registry
operates in the country by the end of 1999 , zero otherwise. Private Bureau is a dummy variables which takes on
value one if a private credit bureau operates in the count可 by the end of 1999, zero otherwise. Firm auditing is a
dummy variable which takes on value on if the firm provide its shareholders with annual tinancial statements
that have been reviewed by an extemal auditor, and 0 otherwise. Higher value indicates more information
disclosure of the tirm. Private Bank Ownership indicates of the banking system 這出sets in the banks that are 50
percent or more owned by private investors. Foreign 8ank Ownership indicates the share of banks owned by
foreign investors. Govemment is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if any govemment agency or state body
has a tinancial stake in the ownership of the firm , 0 otherwise. Foreign is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if
any foreign company or individual has a tinancial stake in the ownership of the tirm. Law enforcement is a tirm
level survey indicator which measures the enforceability of court's decision with a higher value indicating better
law enforcemen t. Law enforcement is a tirm level survey indicator which measures the faimess and
impartialness of cou前 ' s decision with a higher value indicating more faimess. Firm size is the natural logarithm
of tinn sales in US$. Exporter is a dummy variable that takes on value one if the tirm is an exporter and zero
otherwise. Creditor Rights is an index which measur
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Table 8: Inforrnation , Competition and Corruption witn More Macro Controls
(2)
(3)
(4)
(1)
Bank Concentration (Depos it)
0.861
1.05 1
1. 07
1. 173
[0 . 003) 叫*
[0 . 002) 叫*
[0 . 004) 材*
[0.014)**
Applicati on Denied
0.565
0 .4 43
0.306
0 .4 53
[0.009) 抖*
[0.230)
[0.077)*
[0.061)*
Entry Barrier
0.206
0.225
0.233
0.235

(5)
1. 04
[0 . 003) 村*

0 .4 57
[0.074]*
0.231

[0 . 012) 叫

[0 . 003] 抖*

[0 . 010] 抖*

[0 . 005) 抖*

[0 . 010] 抖*

Private Bureau

-0.064
[0.691]
-0.398

-0.007
[0.960]
-0.355

0.018
[0.908]
-0.358

[0 . 017] 叫

[0.036] 抖

Firm Auditing

-0.276

-0.278

0.015
[0.921]
-0.324
[0.086]*
-0.28

0.014
[0.931]
-0.326
[0.069]*
-0.282

[0.001]* 叫

[0.000] 材*

[0.000] 叫*

Pri vate Bank Ownership

-0.005
[0.117]
-0.011

-0.003
[0.284]
-0.007
[0.066]*
-0.299

-0.003
[0.331 ]
-0 .008

Public Credit Registry

Foreiεn

Bank Ownership

[0 . 013] 抖

[0 . 045] 村

-0.285
[0.000]***
-0.003
[0.316]
-0.008

[0.000] 叫*

-0 .003
[0.363]
-0.008

[0 . 031] 抖

[0.029] 材

[0.0 3 5] 抖

-0.297

-0.295

-0.293

Govemment

-0.32
[0 . 001] 叫*

[0 . 001] 抖*

[0 . 002] 抖*

[0 . 002] 抖*

[0 . 002] 料*

Foreign

-0.134

-0. 134
[0.027]**
0.019
[0.719]
-0.049

-0.142

-0.141

-0. 141

[0.021] 抖

[0 . 020] 村

[0.021] 抖

0.021
[0.690]
-0.047

0.014
[0.793]
-0.052

0.022
[0.690]
-0.046

[0.031] 抖

Competitor
Fair Court
Law Enforcement
Firm Size
E x p o 付 er

Creditor Rights
Depos it 1nsurance
Bank Accounting Disclosure
Democracy
Openness

0.003
[0 .949]
-0.055
[0 . 003] 抖*

[0.011] 抖

[0.016] 抖

[0.007] 抖拿

[0.021] 抖

-0.086
[0.000]***
0.007
[0.582]
-0.188

-0.079

-0.082

-0.082

-0.08

[0 . 001] 抖*

[0 . 000] 抖*

[0 . 000] 抖*

[0 . 000] 抖*

0.003
[0.820]
-0.166

-0.0002
[0 .989]
-0.169

-0.0005
[0.969]
-0. 165
[0.002]***
-0.052
[0.3 34]
0.271

[0.000] 叫*

[0 . 003] 叫*

[0 . 002] 材*

-0.068
[0.178]
0.276

-0.056
[0.271]

-0.054
[0.319]
0.26

0.0002
[0.986]
-0. 177
[0.001]***
-0.049
[0.387]
0.254

[0 . 012] 叫

[0 . 025] 抖

[0.014] 叫

[0 . 01 6 ] 抖

[0 . 01 2 ] 抖

0.227
[0.054]*
-0.029
[0.887]
0.007
[0.106]

0.101
[0 .4 11 ]

0.127
[0.262]

0.152
[0. 171]

0.132
[0.234]

Yoice and Accountability

O 可-呵.).)
呵

-0.225
[0.086]*

Govemment Effectiveness

-0.095
[0 .4 20]

Rule ofLaw

0.008
[0.930]

Control of Corruption
Other Macro-controls
Industry Dummies
Observations

ves
yes
3,270

y es
yes
3,270
45

yes
yes
3 ,270

yes
yes
3,270

-0.096
[0.357]
yes
ves
3 ,270

8ank corruption is the response to the question "Is the corruption of bank offìcials as an obstacle for the
operation and growth of your business (I-no obstacle , 2- minor obstacle , 3- a moderate obstacle, 4-major
obstacle)". 8ank concentration (Deposit) is the fraction of total deposits held by the five largest banks in the
industrγ8ank concentration (Asset) is the fraction of total assets held by the five largest banks in the industry
Entry barrier measures the entry into banking requirement , which is a variable developed based on eight
questions regarding whether various types of legal submission are required to obtain a banking license. The
index ranges from 0 (Iow entry requirement) to 8 (high entry requiremen t). Higher values indicate greater
stringency. Application Denied is the percentage to which applications to enter banking are denied in the past
five years. Public Credit Registry is a dummy variable which takes on value one if a public credit registry
operates in the country by the end of 1999 , zero otherwise. Private 8ureau is a dummy variables which takes on
value one if a private credit bureau operates in the countηby the end of 1999‘ zero otherwise. Firrn auditing is a
dummy variable which takes on value on if the firm provide its shareholders with annual financial statements
that have been reviewed by an external auditor, and 0 otherwise. Higher value indicates more infonnation
disclosure of the finn . Private 8ank Ownership indicates of the banking system's assets in the banks that are 50
percent or more owned by private investors. Foreign 8ank Ownership indicates the share of banks owned by
foreign investors. Government is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if any govemment agency or state body
has a financial stake in the ownership of the firm , 0 otherwise. Foreign is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if
any foreign company or individual has a financial stake in the ownership of the firm . Law enforcement is a finn
level survey indicator which measures the enforceability of court ‘ s decision with a higher value indicating better
law enforcemen t. Law enforcement is a finn level survey indicator which measures the faimess and
impartialness of court's decision with a higher va\ue indicating more faimess . Finn size is the natural logarithm
of firm sales in US$. Exporter is a dummy variable that takes on value one if the firm is an expo叫er and zero
otherwise. Creditor Rights is an index which measures the power 0
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